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RETHINKING UNTHINKABLE PUNISHMENT
POLICIES IN AMERICA

Michael Tonry
Many contemporary American criminal justice policies and developments,
such as "real offense sentencing," the use of youth as an aggravatingfactor in
sentencing, and "disintegrative shaming" as a rationale for punishment, defy
conventional moral norms and conflict with mainstream theoretical justifications
for punishment. In this Article, Michael Tonry examines reasons why such policies
nonetheless enjoy widespread public and scholarly support. Drawing on historical literature on long-term crime trends and their relation to criminal justice
policy and sociological literature on "moralpanics," he argues that current punitive excesses are the result of a convergence of several powerful forces. A series
of "moral panics" about sexual and violent crime and an overall reduction in
crime and drug-use rates have combined to make policies seem unobjectionable
today that would be unthinkable in other times. Tonry concludes with suggestions about how to address these problems in the future, and how to make criminaljustice policies more humane and more effective.
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INTRODUCTION
We live in a repressive era when punishment policies that would be
unthinkable in other times and places are not only commonplace but also are
enthusiastically supported by public officials, policy intellectuals, and much
of the general public. This Article's aim is to consider why serious people
today think things to be ethically or morally tolerable that serious people in
other times would believe to be ethically or morally wrong.
Most modern theories of punishment attach considerable importance
to the concept of proportionality-that more serious crimes warrant more
punitive sanctions than less serious crimes, and that comparably serious
crimes warrant comparably severe sanctions. The principal debate has been
between retributivists such as Andrew von Hirsch' who argue that proportionality is a central feature of any system of punishment, and limiting
retributivists, such as Norval Morris,' who argue that proportionality is one
valid concern among many and sets outer limits on morally justifiable punishments. Positivists such as H.L.A. Hart 3 also subscribe to proportionality
ideas, but on empirical grounds; a punishment system that regularly imposed
disproportionate punishments would defy conventional morality, create a
sense of public insecurity, and lose credibility. Even classical utilitarians like
Jeremy Bentham4 adopted a punishment-limiting moral principle under the
rubric of "parsimony": No punishment can be morally justified unless,
taking account of the suffering it imposes on the offender, it produces net
happiness or utility.5
Yet modern punishment policies regularly require imposition of disproportionate penalties, and some influential scholars justify such laws on
grounds that in other times would place them so far outside the mainstream
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS (1993).
NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974).
H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968).
JEREMY BENTHAM, 4 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM (John Bowring ed., 1843).

See MORRIS, supra note 2, at 60-62.
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as not to be credible, or do not bother to justify them at all.' Sentencing
laws and guidelines in the federal system and many states require harsher
penalties for drug crimes than for many assaults, rapes, and homicides California's three-strikes law demands twenty-five-year and longer sentences for
people convicted of trivial third felonies.8 Some justify such policies on the
populist rationale that punishments may legitimately reflect (nebulous) popular demands for vindictive and shaming punishments. Put differently, the
important relationship is not between crime and punishment, or between
punishment and public safety, but between punishment and public edification. This is a profoundly radical idea that entirely removes, in Ronald
Dworkin's phrase, equal "respect and concern"9 for the offender's interests
from the crime-and-punishment equation.
My primary aim here is not to argue with such policies and propositions
but to consider why they have taken shape now and not at other times. My
explanation draws on the historical literature on long-term trends in drug
use and on the sociological literature on moral panics. At times after drug
use has peaked and begun to decline, public attitudes harden, debate about
crime and drug abuse narrows, and policies become harsher. Separately,
and often of shorter-term significance, combinations of broad-based public
insecurities and shocking incidents combine to create moral panics-the
Salem witch trials are a notable example, but there have been many others,
often precipitated by violent, sexual, or otherwise frightening events. During
moral panics, people collectively exaggerate the scale of problems, behave
intolerantly, and do things or adopt policies that in less hysterical times
would be rejected. Many people come to believe different things from what
they would believe at other times (and others come to say things they
would not say at other times). We live in a time when a series of moral
panics about sexual and violent crime and about drugs have coincided with
downturns in crime and. drug use, which has meant that the short-term
effects of moral panics have exacerbated the effects of long-term cyclical
changes in attitudes associated with drugs (and probably crime). Current
repressive policies are the result. The hitherto unthinkable became not only
thinkable but acceptable.
Yale law professor Dan Kahan, for example, has argued that the ex post
facto idea is wrong in substantive principle, though there may be prudential
reasons to use it to limit legislative power. Judges, however, should be able
6.
See WILLIAM J. BENNETT ET AL., BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY... AND How To
WIN AMERICA'S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 82-136 (1996).
7. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2D1.1(a)(1), 2A2.1(a)(1) (1998).
8.
See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(d)-667(i) (Deering 1998).
9.
See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 227 (1977).
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through retrospective reinterpretation of laws to criminalize and punish
behaviors that were not criminal when committed. The logic is that a person who does something morally wrongful knows it, and if a judge retroactively decides to treat that act as a crime, so be it; the defendant should have
known better. To make the case that we should not be concerned about abrogation of customary due process ideas, Kahan provides examples of sexually
exploitative but legal behavior."0 Such acts strike emotional chords in most
people; it is not fair if people abuse their power over others to coerce voluntary acceptance of sexual intimacy, and it is easy to empathize with the
victim. The logic, however, applies equally to retroactive criminalization of
homosexuality, adultery, drug use, or blasphemy. That is why every Western
legal system recognizes the ex post facto principle. The realms of right,
moral, and legal conduct have never been perfectly congruent. Legislative
definition of wrongful conduct as criminal occurs at a critical moment only
after which the state may act against an individual. With the passage of
time, such arguments will again become unthinkable in the United States.
The main theme of this Article is something we all know: Our upbringings, past experiences, material circumstances, and immediate environments
shape the way we see and understand the world. The wealthy are not only
more likely than the poor to support reduction in social spending for income
redistribution, but also to believe that such reductions will have beneficial
effects. Members of minority groups are not only more likely than majority
citizens to support affirmative action, but also to believe that such policies
have beneficial effects. People who work in the city but live in the suburbs
are more likely to support building of new motorways, and to believe them
necessary and appropriate public works, than are people who live in urban
neighborhoods that will experience increased traffic noise, congestion, and
lowered property values.
And on and on. We all know this. I don't mean to be reductionist. Not
all people's beliefs correspond with predictions based on self-interest and biographical details, and no one's beliefs do all the time. There are wealthy white
10.
See Dan M. Kahan, Some Realism About Retroactive Criminal Lawmaking, 3 ROGER WMS.
U. L. REV. 95 (1997). His example:
Jones tells Smith that unless she engages in sexual relations with him he will fire her and
will file a complaint accusing her-falsely-of stealing merchandise from the store.

Because she is desperately dependent on her meager income from the store to support her
children, is otherwise virtually unemployable because of her criminal record and faces
revocation of her parole if she is found to have engaged in any criminal wrongdoingfacts that Jones understands perfectly well-Smith relents. Nevertheless, several months
later, steeled in her resolve by the support of a new friend, Smith reports Jones to the
police.

Id.at 97.
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socialists and poor black libertarians. And there are people whose actions
are primarily driven by conscious self-interest: A female professional may in
principle believe a just society would have a more equal income distribution
than does the contemporary United States but may in practice oppose
redistributive policies because she does not want her own living standard
reduced.
The important point, however, is probabilistic and not cynical. What
people genuinely believe (or think they believe) is powerfully influenced by
where and when they stand in the world, and what they are likely to believe
can be predicted on the basis of the material conditions of their lives. One
important corollary is that people will believe different things under different circumstances. A second is that, knowing these things, an ethical person
in thinking about policy issues would try to be sensitive to the difference
between enduring and timeless ideas about justice and injustice and those
that are merely the product of time-bound conditions and circumstances.
A third is that many contemporary policies could not survive that scrutiny.
Assertions such as these require explication. Accordingly, Part I explains
in some detail several modem policies and policy proposals that would have
been unthinkable a quarter century ago: the federal sentencing guidelines'
"relevant conduct" provision that requires judges to punish offenders for
crimes of which they were not convicted;" a Virginia sentencing guidelines
provision that systematically punishes young offenders more severely than
offenders like-situated in all respects except that they are older; and
Kahan's theory of disintegrative shaming that takes traditional sociological
ideas about the moral-educative effects of punishment and humane modem
ideas about "reintegrative shaming"" and turns them into deeply repressive
ideas about the use of human beings to the end of appeasing public appetites
for "debasement.' 4
Part II introduces the historical literature on long-term crime trends
and the relations between drug-use trends and policy, and the sociological
literature on moral panics. The historical literature demonstrates that crime
11.
12.

See U.S. SENTENCINoGUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 1A4(a), 1B1.3 (1998).
See 1997 VA. GRIM. SENTENCING COMM'N ANN. REP. 47-52.

13.
See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION passim (1989).
14.
See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Punishment lncommensurabiliy, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 691,
702-08 (1998). "We expect society to punish individuals with a mode of affliction that signals their
disgraceful status." Id. at 702 (emphasis added). "Like imprisonment but unlike fines and community

service, shaming penalties supply an unambiguous and dramatic sign of the wrongdoer'sdisgrace." Id. at
705 (emphasis added). "The meaning of community service is subject to similar reform. One way to
infuse this sanction with shame is to order offenders to perform serices that unambiguously denote
humiliation. Some tasks, such as trash collection or manure shoveling, fit this description because
they are believed intrinsically repulsive." Id. at 706 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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trends change slowly and over long periods and for reasons that have little
to do with crime-control policies, and that there is a recurring pattern of
enactment and enforcement of the harshest antidrug policies after drug use
has begun to decline. The sociological literature demonstrates the regular
occurrence of moral panics about crime, during which the general public
and elected officials support ill-considered and inhumane policies that in
other times would not be seriously considered.
Part III shows that the predictions generated by the crime-trend and
moral-panic literatures fit reasonably closely the experiences of the past quarter
century and explain why previously unthinkable policies and proposals enjoy
their current vogue.
The Conclusion draws lessons from the preceding sections. The principal lesson is that historical conditions and social pressures often lead policy makers and others to do things that, on reflection and with the passage
of time, they will realize to have been cruel and unnecessary. Human beings
cannot be perfectly rational, but ethical human beings try to understand the
pressures that influence them and to resist those that are unworthy. Folk
wisdom expresses this in such aphorisms as "Don't take out your frustrations
on your child," "Sit down and count to ten," and "Write the angry letter
today but wait 'til tomorrow to send it." If policy makers and others had
subscribed to such beliefs not only in their private lives but also in their
public ones, American crime and drug-control policies in the 1990s would
have looked very different.
I.

UNTHINKABLE POLICIES

What is "unthinkable" to one person may not be to another, so I have
sought out examples of modern policies that reflect rejections of conventional views in the United States at other times and in other countries
today. The first is the federal sentencing guidelines' relevant-conduct provision, often referred to as "real offense sentencing."" The second is a provision of the Virginia sentencing guidelines that, all else equal, punishes
younger offenders more harshly than older offenders. 6 The third is Kahan's
"punishment incommensurability" theory of punishment as debasement. 7
The three examples are merely illustrative and were picked because
they are largely unknown except among specialists. Lest it be thought that
they are merely aberrations or jurisdictional anomalies, of which every era
affords examples, do not forget that they have occurred in a time when the
15.
16.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IBI.3 (1998).
See 1997 VA. CRIM. SENTENCING COMM'N ANN. REP. 47-52.

17.

See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 14, passim.
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United States is awash in three-strikes laws, sexual-psychopath laws, truthin-sentencing laws, and local, state, and death-row prisoners.
A.

Real Offense Sentencing

The federal real offense sentencing policy directs judges to calculate
sentences not only on the basis of offenses of conviction but also on the
basis of uncharged offenses, offenses for which charges were dropped or dismissed, and offenses of which the defendant was acquitted at trial that the
judge, by a civil law preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, determines
the defendant committed.
Three things about real offense sentencing are distinctive. First, it
reflects a radical rejection of basic ideas of fairness; affected offenders lose the
benefit of the criminal law probative standard of "proof beyond a reasonable
doubt," the rules of evidence, and constitutional procedural protections as
basic as notice. Second, it exists in the federal sentencing guidelines"8 and,
so far as I have found, nowhere else in the United States or in any other
Western country. Third, despite its radical nature, neither the U.S. Sentencing Commission nor the federal appellate courts have shown much
concern about it.
Section 1B1.3 of the federal guidelines provides that sentences shall be
calculated on the basis of the offender's "relevant conduct," or as the commission called it in explaining the provision, his "actual offense behavior."' 9 The
rationale was that the relevant conduct approach would offset efforts by
prosecutors to manipulate the guidelines through their charging and dismissal decisions, which could determine the cell of the guidelines matrix
governing a particular case and thereby greatly constrain the judge's choices.
Judge Gerald Heaney of the Eighth Circuit described the rule's operation:
Under the guidelines, however, sentencing judges are routinely
required to sentence offenders for "relevant conduct" which has not
been charged in an indictment or information and which was not
admitted in a guilty plea or proved at trial. Indeed, a court may also
increase an offender's sentence for acts for which the offender was
acquitted. Uncharged conduct need not be proved beyond
0 a reasonable doubt, but only by a preponderance of the evidence.
Judge Heaney slightly understated the provision's force in that the
judge must, not "may," take account of uncharged conduct in calculating
18.
19.
20.

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IA3 (1998).
See id. §§ IA3, IBI.3.
Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End toDisparity, 28 AM.

CRIM. L. REV. 161, 209 (1991).
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the applicable guideline range and must sentence from within that range
unless grounds exist for a mitigated departure.
Statutory sentence maximums are the only absolute constraint on the
relevant conduct provision. If, for example, the statutory sentence maximum for the charge of conviction is sixty months, the applicable guideline
range for that offense is forty to forty-six months, and the applicable guideline range for all relevant conduct is 108 to 120 months, no sentence longer
than sixty months may be imposed.
The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of real offense
sentencing in general21 and in the case of offenses of which the defendant
was acquitted.22 The rationale in Witte v. United States, "3 on the basis of
Williams v. Okahoma, 24 is that it was always so. In the rehabilitation-premised
era of indeterminate sentencing, judges could take account of anything they
deemed relevant in making an individualized decision in a particular case,
and that was the stated rationale of Williams.25 The Supreme Court, however,

seemed untroubled by the segue from, "the court may take account in order
to individualize" to "the court must take account even though it may not
individualize."
Every state that has adopted sentencing guidelines has rejected real
offense sentencing for two reasons: The "Caesar's wife" notion that justice
should not only be done but be seen to be done, and the practical objection
that often it will not work because plea-bargaining lawyers will figure ways
to defeat it. 6 When I describe federal real offense sentencing to lawyers
and judges outside the United States, the reaction is always a combination
of incredulity and disapproval. In Australia, for example, a country without
sentencing guidelines or mandatory minimums and in which the desirability
of judicial discretion to individualize sentences is widely supported, as Arie
Freiberg describes it, "Unlike the 'real offence' sentence enhancements
employed at the federal level in the United States, Australian courts have
maintained strict control of the factual foundations of sentence, which limits appear to be far greater than those of conviction offence-based American
state guideline systems .... ""

21.
22.
23.
24.

Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389 (1995).
United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997).
515 U.S. 389 (1995).
358 U.S. 576 (1959).

25.
See Witte, 515 U.S. at 397 (citing Williams, 358 U.S. at 250-51).
26.
See MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 78 (1996).
27.
Arie Freiberg, Three Strikes and You're Out-It's Not Cricket: Colonizaton and Resistance
in Australian Sentencing, in PUNISHMENT AND PENAL SYSTEMS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES (Michael
Tonry & Richard Frase eds., forthcoming 2000) (manuscript at 49, on file with author).
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Youth as an Aggravating Circumstance

Under Virginia's sentencing guidelines, youth is an aggravating circumstance that increases the likelihood that a person convicted of a drug,
fraud, or larceny charge will be sentenced to imprisonment. This stands on its
head the mainstream view for most of this century in this and most Western
countries that youth is a mitigating factor. The juvenile court, however beleaguered in our time by law-and-order politics, still exists in every American
jurisdiction and is premised on notions that kids are different and should be
treated differently from adult offenders.
Rationales for different treatment have varied over time and between
people. Sometimes the argument is that young people are morally immature
and, for that reason, less fully responsible for their actions. Sometimes the
argument is that young people are developmentally immature and thus
more malleable and "amenable to treatment." Sometimes the argument is
that many people do things as teenagers, because they are teenagers, that
they will later regret, and that aging is all that is needed to turn most into
law-abiding citizens; criminal records would damage them and their life
chances for no good reason. Whatever the rationale, even the most aggressive attacks on the juvenile court-in changes to waiver, offense-exclusion,
and age-jurisdiction laws-leave a large majority of cases traditionally handled
by juvenile courts within the courts' jurisdiction."
Explaining what Virginia policy makers did requires a close look at Virginia's guidelines. The guidelines, like all U.S. sentencing guidelines, specify
whether prison should be imposed and for how long on the basis of interactions between the offense of conviction and the offender's criminal history.
However, for people sentenced for drug offenses (14,193 in 1997), larceny
(8817), and fraud (4725), a separate scoring sheet indicates who among them
should be sentenced to community punishments instead of the recommended
prison sentence. This is an important provision because those three offenses
constituted 71% of sentenced cases in 1997.9
The scoring sheet, shown as Table 1,30 assigns points to various of the
offender's characteristics. Some, such as prior arrests, convictions, and

28.

See general y FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADO-

LESCENCE (1982); Franklin E. Zimring, Toward a Jurisprudenceof Youth Violence, in 24 CRIME AND

JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH-YOUTH VIOLENCE 477 (Michael Tonry & Mark H. Moore
eds., 1998).

29.

See 1997 VA. RIM. SENTENCING COMM'N ANN. REP. 22.

30.

Table I is adapted from 1997 VA. RIM. SENTENCING COMM'N ANN. REP. 52 fig.35.
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Drug =-

Section D

IIIIIII

INELIGIBILITY CONDITIONS
Was the offender recommended for Ni incarceration on Section B? ......................................................................................

__

Yes

Do any of the offenses at sentencing involve thesale,distribution, or possession
with intent, etc. of cocaine of a combined
quantity of 28 g.35
grams (I ounce) or m ore? ..........................................................................................................................

Yes

Are any of the offenses in the offender's prior record listed on pp.51-59 in the Virginia Sentencing Guidelines Manual? .

Yes

Are any ofthe offenses at sentencing listed on pp.51-59 in the Virginia Sentencing Guidelines Manual? ...........

. .. .. .. . .. .. .. . .. .

Yes

Do NOT complete Section D if any of the above conditions are met.

*

Offender
A.
B.

C.
D.

Score factors A - D andenter the total score

I E ]
Offender's ageat time of offense
Younger than 20 years .............................................................................
6
.J
20-27 years.........................................................................................
4
28-33 years.........................................................................................
3
Score
34"years or older ......................................................................................
0
Offender never married at time of offense ................................................................
Offended unemployed at time ofoffense .............................................................
I [21
TuW[
O ffender is a male ....................................................................................................

[

*

Offender Alone (no accomplice) When Primary Offense (any counts) Committed -

#

Additional Offenses Total themaximumpenalties
foradditional offenses,including counts
Y ess:
Lessthan
6.................................................................................................................................
0
6 -27 ..................................................................................................................................................
28-4 8 ......................................................................................................................................
;............2
49 or mo ..............................................................................................................................................
.
3

*

Prior Arrest or Confinement Within Past 12 Months

*

Total Felony/Misdemeanor Convictions and Adjudications
Select the combination of prior felonies andcriminal misdemeanors that characterize the offender's prior record

#

0 Flonle

1-2
3+

Misdemeanors
........
Misdemeanors
.
2

I Fdlo

0
1-2
3-7
8+

Misdemeanors
Misdemeanors ..... 2
Misdemeanors 3
Misdemeanors 4

If YES, add 2 -- 110-

[-

If YES, addi

elos

4+ Felon

-]

0-2
3-7
8+

Misdemeanors
...........3
Misdemeanors
...........4
Misdemeaanos
...........5
3
Misdemeanors ........... 3
0
I-7 Misdemeanam
...........
8+ M dneanms........... 4
5

Prior Felony Drug Convictions/Adjudications
Number: I ..................................................................................................................
I
.....: . 2
***
........................... .............
**
.................
........... ****.........................
32..................
... ..............................
... ... ... .................................................
- - ............................ *........................................... 3

2............................~E

4 or more................................................................................................................................................

,2g

4

*

Prior Adult Incarcerations
N umber
1-2 ..............................................................................................................
............
3-.4 ...............................................................................................
2
$ or mor ................................................................................................................................................
-. L -.
Soosre.........................
............................. 3

#

Prior Juvenile lncarcerations/Commltments

If YES, add 4 --

Total Score

0is recommended.
Iftotal is 9 orless, analternativepunishment
If total is 10or more.incarcmation is recommended.

Tahle 1

I

]
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incarcerations, relate to the offender's past criminality. Others, such as sex,
age, marital status, and employment record, relate to personal characteristics. Although many people might question a number of these policy
choices-being male, unmarried, and unemployed all warrant "points" that
increase the imprisonment likelihood-here my concern is age.
Age counts against a defendant's chances of avoiding prison in two
ways. It is important to know that nine points is the cutoff above which
offenders go to prison. First, the younger the offender, the more points: under
twenty years old (six points), twenty to twenty-seven (four points), twentyeight to thirty-three (three points), thirty-four or older (no points). Second,
any prior juvenile commitment or incarceration counts four points. Thus, any
affected seventeen-year-old thief or drug dealer (six points) who previously
was committed to a juvenile institution (four points) scores a total of ten
points and should go to prison. So much for the beliefs that young offenders
deserve special tolerance, solicitude, or the benefit of the doubt.
The juvenile aggravators are more striking when compared with other
factors that get scored. No other factor is weighted more heavily than being
under age twenty-eight, and few as heavily as a prior juvenile court record.
Having four or more felony convictions, for example, counts for three points.
Having been incarcerated as an adult five or more times, for example, counts
as three points.
Now compare two hypothetical offenders. An unemployed (one point)
male (one point) seventeen-year-old (six points) drug offender, with a
one-week juvenile commitment at age fifteen (four points), totals twelve
points, and should go to prison. An unemployed (one point), male (one
point), thirty-four-year-old (no points) drug offender with four prior felony
convictions (three points) and five prior adult incarcerations (three points)
totals eight points and should be diverted from prison. Most people, knowing
no more, would suppose that some seventeen-year-olds such as the one
described should go to prison but that many probably should not. My guess,
however, is that few people would have equal ambivalence about thirtyfour-year-olds with the record described.
A certain logic underlies the Virginia guidelines' "selective incapacitation" rationale. 3 If the only concern at sentencing were prediction of future
offending, if matters of fairness, justice, and youth policy were deemed not
relevant, Virginia's antiyouth policies would make sense. At least three
robust empirical findings are relevant.

31.

See id. at 41-52.
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First, criminal-careers research instructs that most active offenders age
out of criminality by their mid-thirties. 2 Thus, thirty-four-year-olds are less
likely than younger offenders to reoffend. This "justifies" the seeming anomaly that older offenders with lengthy records receive no aggravating points.
Second, developmental research in the United States and other countries instructs that there are distinct age-crime curves, with the prevalence
of offending peaking in the mid-teens for property offending and in the late
teens for violent offenders, with rapid drop-offs after the peak ages.3 Thus,
the older the offender, the more likely that he will soon desist from crime.
This "justifies" the anomaly that the aggravating points are inversely related
to the offender's age.
Third, developmental research shows that early onset of serious delinquency is a strong predictor both of seriousness of offending and continuation
of offending. 4 The specialized vocabulary of this literature distinguishes
between "adolescence-limited" offenders and "life-course persisters."35 The
former are wild-oats teenagers for whom delinquency is a short-term developmental phase, and the latter are more intractable offenders whose
delinquency extends into adulthood. An early onset of delinquency is one
characteristic that often distinguishes life course persisters from adolescencelimited offenders. This, arguably, "justifies" the heavy weight given to a
juvenile record.
Many objections could be raised to the Virginia scheme. Punishing
people more harshly because they are male violates gender-neutrality
norms. Punishing people more severely because of a prior arrest violates
due process notions; some innocent people are arrested as are some guilty
people who for one or another reason cannot be convicted. Giving greater
punitive weight to offenders' ages than to their past criminality violates
basic and widely shared culpability notions. But most strikingly, counting
people's youth against them rather than for them, when the age-crime
curves tell us that many young offenders will not be chronic offenders,

32.

See PANEL ON RESEARCH ON CRIMINAL CAREERS,

1 CRIMINAL CAREERS AND

"CAREER CRIMINALS" 86-89 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1986); see generally MICHAEL TONRY
ET AL., HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR (1991).

33.

See David P. Farrington, Age and Crime, in 7 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL

REVIEW OF RESEARCH 189 passim (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1986).

34.

See Richard E. Tremblay & Wendy M. Craig, Developnental Crime Prevention, in 19

CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH-BUILDING A SAFER SOCIETY: STRATEGIC
APPROACHES TO CRIME PREVENTION 151, 151 (Michael Tonry & David P. Farrington eds., 1995).

35.

See, e.g., James C. Howell &J.David Hawkins, Prevention of Youth Violence, in 24 CRIME

AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH-YOUTH VIOLENCE, supra note 28, at 263 passim.
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involves countless sacrifices of individual lives and futures in the interest of
aggregate statistical predictions about future offending.
C.

Disintegrative Shaming

3
36
Professor Kahan's "shaming or "punishment incommensurability,
argument is the most bizarre and idiosyncratic of the three examples. Kahan's
basic argument can be briefly summarized. Punishment is not, as most
retributivists and moral theorists suppose, primarily about attributions of
culpability and imposition of deserved punishments, nor, as most utilitarians
suppose, primarily about crime minimization, but about shaming. Most
writers about punishment do not understand this, he says, and if they hope
ever to influence policy they must accept that punishments should "unambiguously express disgust"3 regarding the offender or "unequivocally evince
disgust. ' 39 Elsewhere, he writes that offenders should be subjected to
"intrinsically repulsive," "degrading," or at least "effectively stigmatizing"
punishments and that, for example, community service should be renamed
"shameful service.' 40
So far as I can tell, these ideas derive from two intellectual developments
of recent decades, both of which Kahan either misunderstands or perversely
misinterprets. The first is increased attention to the norm-reinforcing, moraleducative, and expressive effects of punishment. The second is a growing
and increasingly subtle literature on public understanding of and opinion
about punishment.

1.

Shaming

At least three major bodies of literature have shown revived interest in
expressive elements of punishment, although none calls for expressions of
disgust or imposition of repulsive punishments.

36.
See Dan M. Kahan, The Anatomy of Disgust in Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1621,
1639-43 (1998) (book review) [hereinafter Kahan, Anatomy].
37.
See Kahan, supra note 14, passim.
38.
Kahan, Anatomy, supra note 36, at 1656.
39.
Id. at 1642.
By stripping individuals of
Prison, in contrast, does unequivocally evince disgust ....
liberty-a venerated symbol of individual worth in our culture-and by inflicting
countless other indignities-from exposure to the view of others when urinating and
defecating to rape at the hand of other inmates-prison unambiguously marks the
lowness of those we consign to it.
Id.
See Kahan, supra note 14, at 706.
40.
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a.

Expressive Theories of Punishment

The first is the development in the philosophical literature, exemplified by the writings of Antony Duff,4 Joel Feinberg,4 Jean Hampton,43 and
Jeffrie Murphy," of "expressive" theories of punishment. All of these are
moral theories, premised on respect for the moral autonomy of the offender,
in Dworkin's terms showing equal "respect and concern" for each offender,45
and call in various ways for punishment to express to the offender the
wrongfulness of his acts. There are differences in view as to whether the
aim is solely to express norms to the offender, so that he as a morally responsible actor can come to understand the wrongfulness of his acts, or whether
there is also a collateral aim to express norms to the general community as
bystander. However, nowhere in this literature are there indications that
the aim of punishment should be to express disgust regarding the offender
or to debase him in order to placate public opinion. That, in the conventional Kantian language, would be to use the offender merely as a means,
and that is something no mainstream moral theory would allow.46
b.

Moral-Educative Theories of Punishment

The second relevant punishment literature derives from the Durkheimian
functionalist notion that the criminal law serves to identify and reinforce
basic social norms about right and wrong, that "[c]rime brings together
upright consciences and concentrates them."47 The criminal law performs a
dramaturgical function, and punishment is directed primarily at the community and not at the offender. Crime is a part of every human society, possibly
a needed part, a functional mechanism that helps set and then illuminate
the boundaries of acceptable behavior. The primary aim of punishment is
to restate and reinforce prevailing norms: "[Punishment] does not serve, or else
serves only quite secondarily, in correcting the culpable, or in intimidating
possible followers. From this point of view, its efficacy is justly doubtful and,

41.

R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS (1986).

42.

JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 95-118 (1970).

43.
Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 208
(1984).
44.
Jeffrie 0. Murphy, Retributivism, Moral Education, and the Liberal State, 4 CRIM. JUST.
ETHICS 3 (1985).
45.
See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 9, at 227.
46.
On Kant's "punishment views," see NIGEL WALKER, WHY PUNISH? 53-79 (1991).
47. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 102 (George Simpson trans.,
Free Press 1933) (1893).
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in any case, mediocre. Its true function is to maintain social cohesion
intact ....
There has been a revival of interest in Durkheimian ideas about punishment in the past thirty years in Germany and Scandinavia as an alternative to retributive and utilitarian ideas. The Norwegian writer Johannes
Andenaes, who wrote about the "moral-educative functions" of the criminal law, is often identified as an early proponent of such a view. 9 Influential elaborations of such views have been offered by Patrik Tornudd and
Tapio Lappi-Seppala in Finland under the name "general prevention"5 and
in Germany by Bernd Schunemann under the name "positive general prevention."' Both traditions distinguish their neo-Durkheimian ideas from
Anglo-American "(negative) general prevention," which operates through
the utilitarian processes of deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. 52
The German and Scandinavian ideas emphasize that punishment has
an important role to play in setting and reinforcing norms, but it is a secondary role. For the most part, extraordinary circumstances aside, people do
or do not commit crimes because of the socialization they do or do not receive
from primary institutions like the home, the family, the church, the school,
and the community. Hence, the primary work of crime prevention must be
done in those places. It is important that the criminal law reinforce basic
behavioral norms, and be seen to do so, but the primary work must be done
elsewhere. This has important, perhaps to most Americans surprising,
implications.
First, because the law should perform a backup role to the primary
socializing institutions, it is important that criminal acts have penal consequences. As a result, although the Swedes and other Scandinavians have
among the lowest incarceration rates in the world, expressed in terms of
people in prison on an average day per 100,000 residents, they have among
the highest prison admission rates in the developed world, expressed in
terms of the number of people per 100,000 admitted to prison in a year."

48.
49.
50.

Id. at 108.

See JOHANNES ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE passim (1974).
See Tapio Lappi-Seppli, Sentencing and Punishment in Finland: The Decline of the
Repressive Ideal, in PUNISHMENT AND PENAL SYSTEMS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES, supra note 27;
Patrik T6rnudd, Sentencing and Punishment in Finland, in SENTENCING REFORM IN OVERCROWDED
TIMES 189 (Michael Tonry & Kathleen Hatlestad eds., 1997).
51.
See, e.g., Bernd Schunemann, Zum Ste!!enwert der positiven Generalpravention in einer
dualistischenStraftheorie, in POSITIVE GENERALPRAVENTION 109 (1998).
52.
See HART, supra note 3, at 1-27.
53.
See Warren Young & Mark Brown, Cross-nationalComparisons of Imprisonment, in 17
CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1, 5-7 (Michael Tonry ed., 1993).
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Second, because the law should perform its backup role, it is important
that punishments be commensurate with the gravity of the offenses for
which they are imposed. Put differently, proportionality is a first principle;
unless more serious crimes receive harsher penalties and less serious crimes
lesser ones, the law's normative messages will be dissonant and contradict
the primary norm-setting processes."
Third, there is no a priori reason to expect changes in the severity of
penalties to be effective or desirable. T6rnudd observed, "A strong belief
in general prevention as the guiding rationale of the criminal-justice system
thus does not imply that changes in policy, such as increases in the severity
of punishment, would widely be seen as an appropriate or cost-effective
means of controlling crime."" This is one among several principal reasons
why continental Europe has proven unreceptive to U.S.-style crime policies
and politics.
Once again, there is nothing here, express or implied, about debasement, disgust, or stigmatization. Indeed, since northern European countries
take seriously the European Torture Convention's prohibition of inhumane
and degrading punishments," it would be surprising if there were.
C.

Reintegrative Shaming

"Reintegrative shaming," John Braithwaite's proposed paradigm for
reconceptualizing punishment,"7 has had enormous influence and is widely
seen as a core component of restorative justice programs and movements
that are gaining influence throughout the Western world.
Braithwaite's notion is that reactions to crime should simultaneously
express disapprobation and support, in much the same way parents communicate to children that they have misbehaved but that they are still loved.
The "shaming" communicates through disapproval the importance of the
norms or expectations that were violated but in a way that conveys respect
for the individual and concern for his or her well-being, and is therefore
"reintegrative." Reintegrative shaming proponents contrast their approach
with the destructive shaming of traditional Western criminal justice systems
that ostracize, alienate, and often breed defiance or lead to rejection of prosocial norms and attachment to antisocial ones. Braithwaite has recently
54.
55.
56.

See generally Lappi-Seppala, supra note 50.
T6rnudd, supra note 50, at 190.
See MALCOLM D. EVANS & ROD MORGAN, PREVENTING TORTURE: A STUDY OF THE

EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE AND INHUMAN OR DEGRADING
TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT (1998).
57.
See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 13, passim.
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elaborated a series of empirically based theories explaining why conventional criminal justice approaches are likely to be more counterproductive
than are restorative, reintegrative ones."8
Even this brief summary should make clear that Braithwaite's affirmative theories of shaming have nothing in common with Kahan's proposals,
which, to the contrary, embody the kind of traditional destructive processes
that Braithwaite decries.
2.

Public Knowledge and Opinion

The second growing body of literature that might support Kahan's
ideas, but does not, concerns public knowledge and opinion about punishment. In particular, Kahan cites a study by Canadian psychologists Anthony
Doob and Voula Marinos examining Canadians' support for the use of fines
as punishments for various crimes. 9 For many crimes, a majority of respondents indicated that no fine would be an appropriate substitute for imprisonment. Tom Tyler and Robert Boeckmann's study of reasons (primarily
"expressive") why ordinary people support three-strikes laws despite sound
reasons to doubt their instrumental effectiveness offers comparable findings.'
Drawing on a hodgepodge of newspaper clippings and letters to the editor as
6
authority, Kahan makes similar arguments about community service."
There are serious problems with Kahan's argument. It is underinformed;
a large literature shows that public attitudes are much more complex and
less single-mindedly vengeful than he suggests.62 It is overbroad; even if
nonincarcerative punishments for some very serious crimes would, in Model
Penal Code language, "depreciate the seriousness of the defendant's crime,""
most crimes are not that serious. It is parochial; in many Western countries, fines and community service are commonly used as sanctions for quite
serious, including violent and sexual, crimes.6
58.
See John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, in
25 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH (Michael Tonry ed., forthcoming 1999)
(manuscript at 1,on file with author).
59. See generally Anthony N. Doob & Voula Marinos, Reconceptualizing Punishment: Under-

standing the Limitations on the Use of Intermediate Punishments, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 413
(1995).
60.

See generally Tom R. Tyler & Robert J. Boeckmann, Three Strikes and You Are Out, but

Why?, 31 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 237 (1997).
61. See Kahan, supra note 14, at 702-04 nn.33-39.
62. See, e.g., JULIAN V. ROBERTS & LORETTA J.STALANS, PUBLIC OPINION, CRIME, AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE passim (1997).

63. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
64. See generally Sally T. Hillsman, Fines and Day Fines, in 12 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A
REVIEW OF RESEARCH 49 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1990).
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a.

Underinformed

The large multinational public-opinion literature offers much more
complicated findings than Kahan suggests.65 First, surveys consistently show
that the general public believes that the average crime is more serious than
it is, substantially underestimates the severity of punishments imposed, and
generally supports punishments less severe than are now imposed. Second,
the public has ambivalent views about punishment, wanting offenders to be
punished for their crimes but, believing that social disadvantage and drug
dependence are primary causes of offending, also wanting (and being willing
to pay for) rehabilitation programs. Third, for all but the most serious
crimes and the most incorrigible criminals, the public supports community
penalties in lieu of incarceration, so long as the community penalty is burdensome or restitutive (community service or work release coupled with restitution are okay, house arrest alone is not). Thus, while there is some basis
for Kahan's claim that the public wants symbolically appropriate punishments, that by itself is a partial and misleading summary of the evidence.
None of the major scholars of public opinions and attitudes about crime
interprets the preference for symbolically appropriate sentences as a demand
for shaming punishments.
Ironically, there is substantial evidence of public support for wider use
of community service in place of incarceration for many kinds of offenders
because it satisfies symbolic demands for burdensome punishments and
is in an important sense restitutive." To the contrary, community service is
a sanction that Kahan argues must be made "degrading," "stigmatizing,"
"shameful," and "intrinsically repulsive" if it is to win public support.67
b.

Overbreadth

Even if Kahan were right that the public insists on only prison sentences
for violent crimes, most people now admitted to prisons have not been
65.
See, e.g., ROBERTS & STALANS, supra note 62; Julian V. Roberts, American Attitudes
About Punishment: Myth and Reality, in SENTENCING REFORM IN OVERCROWDED TIMES, supra
note 50, at 250; Michael Hough & Julian Roberts, English Believe Sentences Soft and Crime Rising,
OVERCROWDED TIMES, Feb. 1998, at 1, 12-15; see also Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion, Crime, and
CriminalJustice, in 16 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 99 (Michael Tonry ed., 1992).
66.
See Jen Kiko Begasse, Oregonians Support Alternatives for Nonviolent Offenders, in SENTENCING REFORM IN OVERCROWDED TIMES, supra note 50, at 270; John Doble, Survey Shows
Alabamians Support Alternatives, in SENTENCING REFORM INOVERCROWDED TIMES, supra note 50,
at 255; John Doble & Stephen lmmerwahr, Delawareans Favor Prison Alternatives, in SENTENCING
REFORM IN OVERCROWDED TIMES, supra note 50, at 259; Steven Farkas, Pennsylvanians Prefer

Alternatives to Prison, in SENTENCING REFORM IN OVERCROWDED TIMES, supra note 50, at 265.
67.
Kahan, supra note 14, at 706.
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convicted of violent offenses. In 1996, for example, of people admitted to
state prisons, 29.5% had been convicted of violent crimes, 29% of property
crimes, 30.2% of drug crimes, and 11.3% of something else.' In federal
prisons, the percentages of convicted offenders held for the same categories
in 1997 were 11.9%, 5.6%, 60.1%, and 22.4%.69 Among convicted jail
inmates in 1996, the percentages were 21.8% (violent), 28.6% (property),
23.7% (drugs), and 25.9% (others)." The public-opinion evidence summarized in the preceding paragraph shows that for this majority of nonviolent
offenders sentenced to imprisonment, there is broad support for increased
use of nonincarcerative sanctions that do not debase.
c.

Parochialism

Unless Americans have baser, more punitive instincts than citizens of
other Western countries with which the United States is ordinarily compared, experience elsewhere suggests that the public would be willing to
accept fines and community service as prison substitutes for all but the most
serious crimes. Throughout Scandinavia and Germany, for example, day fines
are the modal sanction, including for many violent and sexual crimes and
especially for property crimes.7' In England, Scotland, and Holland, community service was established to serve as an alternative to prison sentences
for moderately severe crimes and is used in that way."
Readers will have to decide for themselves, after reading his articles,
whether I have been too hard on Kahan. His lengthy article on disgust in
the criminal law offers this qualification: "My aim so far has been to show
that disgust does in fact play a central role in criminal law. But nothing I've
said implies, necessarily, that this role is morally justified."" Although this
could be interpreted as a disinterested and detached stance, his subsequent
68.
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1996, at 12 tbl.1.23 (1999).
69.
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS 1997, at 505 tbl.6.51 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1998).

70.
71.
REFORM

Id.at 484 tbl.6.29.
See Hans-J6rg Albrecht, Sentencing and Punishment inGermany, in SENTENCING
IN OVERCROWDED TIMES, supra note 50, at 181; Nils Jareborg, The Swedish Sentencing

Reform, in THE POLITICS OF SENTENCING REFORM 95 (Chris Clarkson & Rod Morgan eds.,

1995); Thomas Weigend, Germany Reduces Use of Prison Sentences, in SENTENCING REFORM IN
OVERCROWDED TIMES, supra note 50, at 177.

72.
See generally Gill Mclvor, CSOs Succeed in Scotland, in INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS IN
OVERCROWDED TIMES 77 (Michael Tonry & Kate Hamilton eds., 1995); Ken Pease, Community
Service Orders, in 6 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 51 (Michael Tonry
& Norval Morris eds., 1985); Peter S.P. Tak, Netherlands Successfully Implements Community Service Orders, in SENTENCING REFORM IN OVERCROWDED TIMES, supra note 50, at 200.
73.

Kahan, Anatomy, supra note 36, at 1648.
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discussions of sentencing, capital punishment, and substantive criminal law,
which strongly endorse the appropriateness of disgust as a determining
element of case outcomes in these contexts, is difficult to reconcile with
detachment and disinterest. Likewise, in his "punishment incommensurability" writing, it is difficult not to interpret his work as a strong endorsement of disintegrative shaming as a desired component of nonincarcerative
sanctions. 4
The two articles I rely on the most, moreover, are but two tiles in a
proposed mosaic of more repressive crime policies. Another article,"7 for
example, calls for abrogation of the long-standing statutory interpretation
principle of "strict construction of penal statutes," on the rationale that
judges, without legislative authority, should be allowed retrospectively to
criminalize behavior they find morally wrongful. Yet another, 76 devastatingly skewered by Chicago law professors Albert Alschuler and Stephen
Schulhofer, 7 calls for abrogation in deteriorated minority inner-city areas of
constitutional limits on police interference with citizens' liberty to walk the
streets. Still another 78 urges, in effect, strict liability for people who knowingly commit minor criminal acts but in fact, because of circumstances
unknown to them, commit a more serious crime. Thus a thief who meant
to commit misdemeanor petit larceny by stealing a wallet containing $10,
who reasonably believed the wallet contained $10, should be convicted of a
major felony if the wallet contained $5000. Kahan's explanation for the
mistake analyses: Defendants who make mistakes will be excused only when
"the offender's mistake negated the inference that he has-failed to internalize society's moral norms."' 9 Through all the repressive proposals runs a
strand of moral judgment. People who behave immorally do not deserve
our sympathy, but instead deserve debasement and harsh treatment. This is
Herbert Packer's "crime-control model" run amok.'
Kahan's arguments for disintegrative shaming are not deducible from
any of the important recent developments concerning expressive punishments or research on public opinion about crime and punishment. What
is left is an idiosyncratic argument that offenders should be subjected to
74.
See Kahan, supra note 14, at 704-08.
75.
Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT.REV. 345.
76.
Tracy L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated ProceduralThinking: A Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197.
77.
Albert W. Alschuler & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Antiquated Proceduresor Bedrock Rights?:
A Response to Meares and Kahan, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215.
78.
Dan M. Kahan, Is Ignorance of Fact an Excuse Only for the Virtuous?, 96 MICH. L. REV.
2123, 2123 (1998).
79.
Id.
80.
See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 153-73 (1968).
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debasing, degrading punishments because, Kahan apparently believes,
offenders have "failed to internalize society's moral norms" and populist
appetites, however well- or ill-informed, would thereby be appeased or gratified. It is an argument, but not much of one.

II.

WHY CERTAIN THOUGHTS AT CERTAIN TIMES?

My aim in Part I was not only to illustrate that various contemporary
crime policies and policy proposals are inhumane and wrong-headed, but to
suggest that such views are not uncommon in our time and place. The
question is how we might understand why those views have so much more
influence here and now than in other times and places. Historians and
sociologists of deviance offer guidance. Historians show that attitudes, public
debate, and policy vary in predictable ways over extended periods in relation
to rises and falls in cycles of deviant behavior. Sociologists show how, usually
unpredictably, short-term moral panics occur during which problems are
exaggerated, public attitudes are polarized, traditional values of moderation
and balance are cast aside, moral entrepreneurs become influential, and
extreme policy measures are adopted. The misfortune for our time is that
long-term deviance cycles during which intolerance and excessive severity
are to be expected have coincided with a series of moral panics, and the
long-term cycles and the short-term panics have each exacerbated the
other's effects.
A. Long-Term Cycles
Three points need to be made. First, in most realms of human experience, tastes and values evolve in regular cycles, and beliefs vary with them.
Second, in the United States and in other Western countries for which data
are available, crime rates change slowly, over extended periods, and for reasons that have no apparent relationship to changes in crime-control policies or criminal justice institutions. Third, in relation to drug policy there
appears to be a predictable interaction between drug-use cycles and punitive
antidrug policies, with the harshest policies being adopted when drug use is
declining rather than, as -at first impression probably seems more likely,
when drug use is rising.
1.

Cycles

Human behaviors, values, and beliefs oscillate over time, moving back
and forth between what are widely seen as fundamentally different positions.
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In politics, regular shifts take place in the breadth of popular support for
conservative and liberal or social-democratic political parties. In religion,
Paul Johnson's landmark history of Christianity documents regular
fluctuations over 2000 years between periods of doctrinal orthodoxy and
fierce, often deadly, resistance to apostasy, and periods of heterodoxy and
tolerance."1 In moral values, John Boswell's landmark history of social
acceptance of homosexuality documents a similar aeons-long pattern of
fluctuating live-and-let-live tolerance and lethal intolerance. 2
Similar oscillation characterizes the arts. Because occasionally in a law
review lawyers should be cited, because the great commercial law scholar
Grant Gilmore was an unusually eloquent lawyer, and because he raises
issues beyond documentation of cycles, I quote Gilmore below at some
length:
We have become used to the idea that, in literature and the arts,
there are alternating rhythms of classicism and romanticism. During
classical periods, which are, typically, of brief duration, everything is
neat, tidy and logical; theorists and critics reign supreme; formal rules
of structure and composition are stated to the general acclaim. During classical periods, which are, among other things, extremely dull,
it seems that nothing interesting is ever going to happen again. But
the classical aesthetic, once it has been formulated, regularly breaks
down in a protracted romantic agony. The romantics spurn the exquisitely stated rules of the preceding period; they experiment, they
improvise; they deny the existence of any rules; they chum around
in an ecstasy of self-expression. At the height of a romantic period,
everything is confused, sprawling, formless and chaotic-as well as,
frequently, extremely interesting. Then, the romantic energy having
spent itself, there is a new classical reformulation-and so -the
rhythms continue."
Gilmore is interesting not only because he provides another example of
recurring alternation between opposed perspectives but because he describes
the force of orthodoxy. Prevailing sensibilities affect how people think.
Formalism during classical peaks receives "general acclaim" because most
people believe formalism is an aesthetically important idea, and at romantic
peaks most people believe that experimentation, spontaneity, and exuberance are important values. People's beliefs are at least influenced and often
determined by the values of the era in which they live, and, accordingly,

81.
82.

See generally PAULJOHNSON, A HISTORY OFCHRISTIANITY (1976).
See generally JOHN BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMO-

SEXUALITY (1980).
83.

GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 102 (1974).
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many individuals would have believed different things had they lived in different times.
People's beliefs about norms, values, and ideals are importantly different from their beliefs about other things, for example, technology. Beliefs
about optimal characteristics of internal combustion engines are probably
not fundamentally cyclical but evolutionary. At any developmental stage,
some engines are preferred because they are cleaner, more efficient, more
reliable, or more durable, but, by those criteria, earlier engines are almost
inevitably, inferior to those later developed. For such things, something like
perfectionism is an intelligible frame of reference. Ideas about romanticism,
homosexuality, religious pluralism, and punishment are not like that.
2.

Long-Term Crime Trends

Crime rates rise and fall over extended periods for reasons that appear
to have little to do with the actions or policies of governments. Historians
who have studied such matters agree that, overall, violence rates in Western
countries have been declining since the middle ages and that a "U-curve" or
backwards "J-curve" characterizes violence rates since the mid-nineteenth
century: declining through the 1950s or 1960s and rising thereafter but to
levels well below the starting points.84 Roger Lane, the leading historian of
the subject, has written: "Everywhere they have been studied, rates dropped
from sometime in the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, in cities
from Stockholm to Sydney as well as across the United States.""
Crime rates then rose in all Western countries, usually beginning in
the 1960s, for several decades. More recently, however, crime rates have
again begun to decline in many Western countries (e.g., Australia, Canada,
Denmark, England and Wales, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, and the
United States) as measured by official police data on recorded crimes, victimization survey data, or, in most countries, both.' Below, I say a bit about
84.

See generally Ted Robert Gurr, Historical Trends in Violent Crime: Europe and the United

States, in I VIOLENCE IN AMERICA-THE HISTORY OF CRIME 21, 21-22 (Ted Robert Gurr ed.,

1989); Roger Lane, Urban Police and Crime in Nineteenth-Century America, in 15 CRIME AND
JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH-MODERN POLICING 1 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds.,
1992).
85.
Roger Lane, Murder in America: A Historian'sPerspective, in 25 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A
REVIEW OF RESEARCH, supranote 58 (manuscript at 191, on file with author).
86.
See, e.g., Freiberg, supra note 27; Christian Pfeiffer, Juvenile Crime and Violence in
Europe, in 23 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 255 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998);
Josine Junger-Tas, Dutch Penal Policies ChangingDirection, OVERCROWDED TIMES, Oct. 1998, at 1,
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Lots, OVERCROWDED TIMES, Feb. 1999, at 1, 11-13.
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reasons for these consistent cross-national patterns, but first an observation
about the relation between crime rates and policy in the nineteenth century.
Figure 17 shows an idealized depiction of the curve of declining U.S.
crime rates from 1840 to 1960 by reference to major criminal justice policy
changes. During the period of long-term decline, most of the major institutions of modern criminal justice systems were established: the penitentiary
(1820s through 1840s), the first probation programs (1850s and 1860s
onwards), the rehabilitation-premised reformatory for young offenders (1870s),
parole (1880s onwards), and the juvenile court (1899 onwards). By 1930,
nearly all of these institutions existed in every American jurisdiction." The
ubiquitous indeterminate sentencing systems that characterized every jurisdiction, and survived everywhere little changed until 1975, had taken
shape. In 1850, something that looked like a combination of modem "truth
in sentencing" and "determinate sentencing" existed everywhere; by 1930 it
existed nowhere.
What to me is most striking about Figure 1 is that, despite the paradigm shift from determinate to indeterminate sentencing and the invention
of so many new and unprecedented institutions, changes in criminal justice
policies, practices, and processes are seldom mentioned as likely or leading
causes of a century-long decline in crime rates.89

Instead, the primary explanation provided by Ted Robert Gurr ° and
Roger Lane ' is a combination of a centuries-long decreasing tolerance for

violence in the West and the effects of the bureaucratization of modem life.
Increasingly since the early nineteenth century, individuals have been socialized into conformity by public schools, factories, the military, and other

institutions. This isnot unlike the Foucauldian thesis in Disciplineand Punish"
that prisons, mental institutions, and the army are illustrative of a wider
range of "disciplinary institutions" that served to mold people to the demands
of the modern state and economy.
87.
Figure 1 is adapted from Gurr, supra note 84, at 22 fig. 1.1. The curves represent combined time-series data for Sydney, Australia; Stockholm, Sweden; and London, England for homicides, assault, robbery, and burglary. The time-series were standardized by valuing the lowest
recorded year for each city as 1.0 and calculating other years' rates as ratios. For a more detailed
explanation, see id. at 21-23 & n.4.
88.
See generally DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM
AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA (1980).
89.

See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN

HISTORY (1993); SAM WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2d ed. 1998).
90.
See generally Gurr, supra note 84.
91.
See generally Lane, supra note 85.
92.
See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan
Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books 1979) (1975).
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Political scientist James Q. Wilson,93 the third-leading scholar of longterm crime trends, argues that a major part of the explanation lies in the
waves of religious revivalism of the nineteenth century. These, he proposes,
strengthened moral and ethical standards of right behavior and personal
responsibility that then became central features of the socialization of children in families, schools, churches, and communities, which in turn
explains the decline in crime rates. Conversely, in the latter half of the twentieth century, traditional norm-creating processes broke down, and the decline
in "the moral sense" is.a major cause of the rising crime rates of the 1960s
through the 1980s. Wilson's explanation of nineteenth-century changes is
not very different from the northern European notion of "positive general
prevention": Most people are law abiding because of their internalized ideas
about right and wrong, which are the product of socialization by primary
institutions like the family, church, and school, and not because they will
be punished if they break the law and get caught. In Wilson's view, social
changes of the last fifty years have broken down these socialization processes.
None of Gurr, Lane, and Wilson primarily attributes nineteenth-century
crime trends to the invention and implementation of the institutions of individualized and indeterminate sentencing. This stands in stark contrast to the
last twenty years in the United States when public figures and many academics have attributed crime rate declines to criminal justice policy changes
like increased use of imprisonment, three-strikes laws, and zero-tolerance
policing, rather than to deeper changes in social norms and institutions.
3.

Drug Use and Drug Policy

There appears to be a regular interaction between declines in drug use,
enactment of harsh public policies, and demonization of minority groups.
The pattern has recurred in the past twenty years in the United States, with
drug use peaking in 1979-80 for most drugs (and 1982-84 for cocaine), the
harshest antidrug laws being passed in the late 1980s, and black inner-city
residents being portrayed as the enemy in the drug wars." The same pattern
may hold for crime in general: Crime rates have fallen since at least the
early 1980s, the harshest laws were passed in the early 1990s, and blacks
and Hispanics have been the principal targets of the crime wars.

93.
See JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE (1993); JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J.
HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 407-38 (1985).
94.
See MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT-RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA 81-123 (1995).
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Because my interest here is in how secular trends affect people's
thinking, the bases for the preceding assertions are only sketched. The basic
outline of the argument comes from historian David Musto's work on the
history of American drug policy,9 embellished a bit by evidence from
historian Joseph Gusfield's work on the history of alcohol policy.96
During the past two centuries, the United States has experienced three
peaks of prohibitionistic moralism: the 1850s, when eight states enacted
alcohol prohibition; 1915-35, the era of national Prohibition; and 1980 to
the present.
a.

Nineteenth-Century Alcohol Prohibition

Antebellum prohibitionism, which culminated at least forty years of
temperance activism, was truncated by the Civil War, which distracted
activists and policy makers from moral and cultural politics. Three things,
however, stand out in Gusfield's account. First, the prohibition and temperance movements of the nineteenth century were partly a product of status
conflicts between cultural groups-settled, abstemious, American Protestants
against newly arrived, often Catholic, immigrants. Prohibition, as portrayed
by Gusfield, was a way in which a "cultural group act[ed] to preserve, defend,
or enhance the dominance and prestige of its own style of living within the
total society. 97
Second, particular minority groups came to personify the dangers and
the lifestyle represented by alcohol:
The significance of abstinence as a symbol of respectability was
enhanced when large numbers of Irish and German immigrants entered
the United States and made up the unskilled labor forces of the
growing urban centers during the 1840's and 1850's. In the culture of
the Irish and the Germans, use of whiskey or beer was customary and
often a staple part of the diet. Both groups were at the bottom of the
class and status structure in American society. In the evolution of
status symbols, the groups at the lowest rungs of the ladder affect the
behavior of those above by a process of depletion in which those
traits originally shared by both groups become progressively deprized
among the more prestigeful. The incoming group thus widens the status
gap between it and the natives. If the lowly Irish and Germans were

95.

See DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL

(expanded ed. 1987).
96.
See JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT (1963).

27.

Id. at 3.
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the drinkers and the drunkards of the community, it was more necessary
an ever that the aspirant to middle-class membership not risk the
possibility that he might be classed with the immigrants."
Thus, easily recognized lower-status groups such as the preponderantly Catholic Irish and German immigrants came to personify the dangers and moral
laxity of alcohol consumption.
Third, when drinkers refused either to accept calls to abstention or to
acknowledge the wrongfulness of their behavior, they became enemies.
When one group acts in a manner contradicting the other's beliefs in
the legitimacy and domination of its own norms, the situation becomes
that of a conflict between enemies....
The assumption that the norms-violator recognizes the legitimacy or domination [of prevalent norms] is contradicted when the
norms-violator is perceived as an enemy[;] ... someone who is hostile and must be approached as an enemy; who must be forced to
accept the dominance of the reformer....
...The object of... reform [thus becomes] a hostile enemy who
must be coerced through legislation...."
All three of these themes-drug policy as an arena of subcultural conflict, identification of minority groups with immorality, and conversion of
people who reject dominant values into enemies-recur in the alcohol and
drug wars of the twentieth century.
b.

Twentieth-Century Drug Prohibition

Musto has often written of the anomaly that prohibitionistic sentiments become strongest and drug policies harshest after drug use has begun
to decline. At various periods, drug use comes into vogue, use increases, and
dangers of abusive use become evident. Then, as Daniel Kagan has summarized
Musto's analysis:
Soon the trend reverses; drug use starts to decline faster and faster.
Public opinion turns against drugs and their acceptability begins
to evaporate. Gradually, drug use becomes associated, truthfully or
not, with the lower ranks of society, and often with racial and ethnic
groups that are feared or despised by the middle class. Drugs become
98.
99.

Id. at 50-51.
Id. at 67-70.
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seen as deviant and dangerous and become a potent symbol of evil.
Trailing behind this decline come large-scale legislative and law
enforcement efforts... aimed at curtailing drug sales and use through
energetic prohibition and enforcement and ever-harsher punishments
against sellers and users. During this period, public opprobrium intensifies into outright fear, hatred of drug dealers and users, and a burning
anger and intolerance toward anyone and anything associated with
drug use.'"
Musto has developed the theme of scapegoating of minority groups:
[Olne cannot help but be concerned that the fear of drugs will again
translate into a simple fear of the drug user and will be accompanied by
draconian sentences and specious links between certain drugs and
distrusted groups within society, as was the case with cocaine and
Southern blacks in the first decade of this century.1° 1
Throughout U.S. history during periods of high intolerance of drug

use, minority-group stereotypes have been associated with deviant drug use."
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, even though middleclass women were the modal category of opiate users, Chinese opium smokers
and opium dens were among the images invoked by opponents of drug use
and were part of the backdrop to the Harrison Act of 1914, ' the first major
federal antinarcotics legislation. At about the same time and in the 1920s,
it was blacks and cocaine. In the 19 30s, imagery of Mexicans and marijuana was prominent in the antimarijuana movements that culminated in the
Marijuana Tax Act of 1937'" and in many state laws criminalizing marijuana
use. In the antidrug hysteria of the 1980s, crack cocaine, the emblematic
drug of the latest drug war, is associated in public imagery with disadvantaged
black residents of the inner cities. '
Musto has described a cyclical pattern of American tolerance and
intolerance of alcohol and drugs. At least three times since the beginning
of the nineteenth century, the United States has moved from periods of
widespread, tolerated, even approved recreational use of alcohol and drugs
to puritanical periods of uncompromising prohibition. The first period of
intolerance began in the 18 2 0s and culminated in prohibition of alcohol in
eight states by the 1850s. The temperance movement of the late nineteenth
century led to national Prohibition; more generalized intolerance of drug

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
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use and users produced the first major federal narcotics laws: the Harrison
Act of 1914, and the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937. Although the first signs
of the contemporary period of intolerance appeared around 1970, a transition year when the U.S. Congress repealed most mandatory sentencing laws
for drug crimes and the Nixon administration declared its war on drugs, it
took firm hold in the early 1980s.
The important thing is not the details of drug-policy history, but the
idea of cycles and movements between them. According to Musto, live-andlet-live attitudes prevail in periods of relative tolerance, like the 1880s and
1960s. In the late nineteenth century, for example, cocaine and opium (and
derivatives) were widely used in patent medicines, most addicts were conventional, law-abiding people, predominantly women, and cocaine was widely
seen as a harmless recreational drug. In the 1960s, marijuana was widely and
openly used; it and many hallucinogens were seen by many as recreational
drugs that were less harmful than alcohol. In the 1970s, before prohibitionistic
attitudes had hardened, President Carter called for federal decriminalization
of possession of marijuana in private for personal use, and a few years earlier
Peter Bourne (later Carter's primary drug-policy advisor) had written that
cocaine "is probably the most benign of illicit drugs currently in widespread
use. At least as strong a case could be made for legalizing it as for legalizing
marijuana. ' 6
During such periods of relative tolerance, traditional American notions
of individualism and personal autonomy allow individuals to make their
own choices about drug use, drug use is widely seen as only mildly deviant or
not deviant at all, and people feel able to argue on the merits for the benefits and pleasures of drug use, for individuals' moral rights to make their own
choices, and against state intrusion on individuals' rights to make those
choices. In periods of intolerance, drug use is widely seen as deviant, and few
people feel comfortable risking moral disapproval or stigmatization by arguing in favor of drug use or tolerance of drug users. Musto notes that
In the decline phase of drug use ....wle tend to have an overkill, that is to say people become so righteous and so zealous that we
can have excesses in the name[] of fighting drugs. There is very little
opposition to 7draconian policies because no one wants to stand up for

using drugs."

106.
MUSTO, supra note 95, at 265 (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted).
107.
Changes in American Public Policy Toward Drug Use over Time-An Historical Perspective
(remarks of David J. Musto), in DRUGS AND CRIME: WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS 36, 42 (Jeffrey A.
Roth et al. eds., 1987) (manuscript on file with author).
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Moral Panics

During the past forty years, historical sociologists and sociologists of
deviance have conceptualized a phenomenon called "moral panics" that
aids understanding of particular times when public hysteria leads to adoption of cruel and intemperate policies that are later regretted. Moral-panic
theory offers important insights into the development of contemporary crime
and drug policies and the politics that surround them.
The concept of moral panic is generally attributed to English sociologist
Stanley Cohen," a product of his effort to explain how an unruly weekend in
an English seaside resort developed into a national crime crisis in England in
1964 that, in turn, led to overwrought newspaper headlines, widespread
public anxiety, redeployment of police resources, anticrime legislation, and
exemplary punishments. Stuart Hall, another English sociologist who wrote
about English moral panics associated with muggings in the 1970s, offered
this description of moral panics: A wave of irrational public fear can be said
to exist
[wihen the official reaction to a person, groups of persons or series of
events is out of all proportion to the actual threat offered, when
'experts'.. . perceive the threat in all but identical terms, and appear
to talk 'with one voice' of rates, diagnoses, prognoses and solutions,
when the media representations universally stress 'sudden and dramatic' increases (in numbers involved or events) and 'novelty', above
and beyond that which a sober, realistic appraisal could sustain ....

Since then, a modest literature has developed on moral panics, and classic earlier sociological works can be reread as accounts of moral panics

expressed in other vocabulary.' Out of chronological sequence, the following paragraphs discuss Cohen's original moral-panic analysis and then backtrack to show how the concept informs Kai Erikson's classic 1966 account
of the Salem witch trials.. and Edwin Sutherland's landmark 1950 account of
the origins of twentieth-century sexual-psychopath laws."'
108.
See STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS (1972).
109.
STUART HALL ET AL., POLICING THE CRISIS: MUGGING, THE STATE, AND LAW AND
ORDER 16 (1978).
110.
See, e.g., NACHMAN BEN.YEHUDA, THE POLITICS AND MORALITY OF DEVIANCE:
MORAL PANICS, DRUG ABUSE, DEVIANT SCIENCE, AND REVERSED STIGMATIZATION (1990);
ERICH GOODE & NACHMAN BEN-YEHUDA, MORAL PANICS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION
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Mods and Rockers'

13

Easter weekend 1964 in Clacton, a small, slightly scruffy, seaside resort
on England's east coast, was cold and wet, the coldest in eighty years. People were disgruntled, shopkeepers because business was slow on the usually
busy weekend, young people because there was little to do. A few small groups
began scuffling and throwing rocks at each other, and Mods and Rockers
factions, two loosely connected groups of working-class youth, began
separating out. There were fights, loud music, and some vandalism, and
motorcycles roared up and down the streets. Eventually there were ninetyseven arrests, twenty-four criminal charges (two or three for violent
crimes), and £513 (then around $1400) in property damage. Smaller scale
"riots," involving less violence, fewer arrests, and less property damage
broke out in other seaside resorts on three-day weekends later in 1964 and
early in 1965.
The Monday after the Clacton "riots," all the national newspapers ran
histrionic stories, usually on page one: "Day of Terror by Scooter Groups,"
"Youngsters Beat Up Town-97 Leather Jacket Arrests," "Wild Ones Invade
Seaside-97 Arrests." Within weeks, legislation to toughen laws on vandalism,
the Malicious Damage Act 1964, was introduced, enacted, and took effect.
Along the way, there was, as Cohen documents in detailed reconstruction
of what actually happened in the riots and in subsequent police, pretrial, and
court proceedings, public hysteria, extensive and hyperbolic media exaggeration, calculated police harassment and intimidation of young people, punitive
abuse of pretrial detention, and vindictive judicial processing and punishment
of criminal charges. Anyone interested to know whether I have exaggerated
Cohen's account and conclusions will have to read his book.
That reaction to the "riots" was exaggerated, however, is shown by the
following statement in parliamentary debates by Henry Brooke, the Home
Secretary (the English equivalent of the U.S. Attorney General):
Some of the reports of what happened at Clacton over the Easter
weekend were greatly exaggerated .... At Clacton more than 1,000
young people came by one means or another, apparently with little
money on them, intending to sleep wherever they could find some
form of shelter. The weather was bad over the Easter weekend and
there was little or nothing to do. They became bored, tempers flared
and a certain amount of fighting broke out. There was nothing like a
riot or gang warfare. Clacton was not sacked.'
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He went on, reports Cohen, to note that acts of assault, theft, or malicious
damage were isolated and committed by small groups of individuals. Nonetheless, the incidents, as they developed in the media and in popular and
political imagery, reified the Mods and Rockers into threatening youth gangs
and created a sense of crisis in English seaside resorts for years to follow.
Things like the Clacton riot have happened throughout history.
Something or someone emerges who threatens established values and interests, the media and state agencies overreact and exaggerate the nature and
scale of the threat, public opinion becomes polarized and demands decisive
government responses, public officials adopt extreme policies, and no one has
very much patience for suggestions that the problem is less serious or more
complicated than it looks.
2.

Quakers and Salem Witches"'

Erikson's Wayward Puritans tells stories of challenges that affected
Massachusetts Bay Colony in the seventeenth century. Two look like moral
panics. The first, the persecutions in 1656-65 of Quakers, whose radically
decentralized religious beliefs were seen as an organized attack on Puritan
Christianity, resulted in legal maimings (ears cut off), executions, and private
violence; the violence ended only after Charles II issued an order for it to cease.
The second was the event we now know as the "Salem witch trials." It all
began early in 1602 in the Salem home of Reverend Samuel Parris, in whose
kitchen a number of young girls aged nine to twenty met regularly with a
slave woman from Barbados named Tituba. Some of the girls began to act
secretively and strangely and the two youngest "began to exhibit a most
unusual malady. They would scream unaccountably, fall into grotesque
convulsions, and sometimes scamper along on their hands and knees making
noises like the barking of a dog."' 6 The town's only doctor could find no
medical explanation and concluded that the Devil had come to Salem and
that the girls were bewitched. Ministers agreed that the Devil must be methead on and that the girls would have to identify the witches who were
harassing them. The girls, for reasons no one understands, soon identified
three women, including Tituba. At the trial, the girls rolled around in:
apparent agony whenever some personal fancy (or the invisible agents
of the devil) provoked them to it. It was a remarkable show. Strange
creatures flew about the room pecking at the girls or taunting them
from the rafters, and it was immediately obvious to everyone that the
women on trial were responsible for all the disorder and suffering.
115.
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When Sarah Good and Sarah Osbume were called to the stand and
asked why they sent these spectres to torment the girls, they were too
appalled to say much in their defense. But when Tituba took the stand
she had a ready answer ....
Tituba gave her audience one of the most
exuberant confessions ever recorded in a New England courtroom.
She spoke of the creatures who inhabit the invisible world, the dark
rituals which bind them together in the service of Satan; and before
she had ended her astonishing recital she had convinced everyone in
Salem Village that the problem was far worse than they had dared
imagine. For Tituba not only implicated Sarah Good and Sarah
Osburne in her own confession but announced that many other
people in the colony were engaged in the devil's conspiracy against
the Bay."'
The three defendants were convicted and two were executed; the third died
in prison.
A year after it began, Salem's witchcraft hysteria ended. In December
1692, Massachusetts Bay Colony Governor Phips reprieved the final eight
persons sentenced to death, discharged every prisoner, and issued a general
pardon to all persons under suspicion. Before that happened, however, nineteen people had been executed, one man was crushed to death under rocks
for refusing to speak at trial, two had died in prison, 150 people were held in
custody, and 280 more had been accused.
Erikson did not write about the Quaker persecutions or the Salem trials as "moral panics"; the term was not yet in use. Instead, he viewed these
events in the Durkheimian framework discussed earlier as "crime waves"
that, together with responses to them, helped identify and protect the
boundaries of normatively acceptable behavior. Why those specific behaviors, and why such extreme responses? Erikson argues that the Colony was a
Puritan theocracy that had outlived its historical moment, and the boundaries
were genuinely ambiguous and in doubt. The bloody repression was an act
of cultural self-defense: "Historically, this kind of behavior is often associated with people who are no longer sure of their own place in the world,
people who need to protect their old customs and ways all the more narrowly
because they seem to have a difficult time remembering quite who they
are. ,18
At this point, several strands have come together: Durkheimian ideas
about crime and punishment as dramaturgical functions of norm declaration
and reinforcement, sociological ideas about deviance as cultural conflict,
and sociological ideas about moral panics.
117.
118.
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Sexual Psychopaths and Predators

There have been at least three periods of heightened concern about sexual predation of children in this century, beginning in approximately 1910,
1940, and 1990."' The best-known book on the topic, Moral Panic: Changing
Concepts of the Child Molester in Modem America by Philip Jenkins, describes
three periods that seem to have been moral panics precipitated by isolated
but horrifying incidents of child sexual abuse that galvanized media attention, public fears, political reactions, repressive legislation, and enhanced
enforcement. The latest, in our time, is manifested in the rounds of passage
in the 1990s of sex-offender registration and notification laws and sexualpsychopath laws providing for civil commitment of sexually "dangerous"
people.'
Nearly a half century earlier, long before moral-panic theory took
shape, Edwin Sutherland, then the most prominent American criminologist, explained why the sexual-psychopath laws of the 1940s were passed.
The background conditions included press concentration on sex crimes that
"produces a widespread uneasiness which, given a few local incidents, readily bursts into hysteria.''. The process:
The diffusion of sexual psychopath laws, consequently, has
occurred under the following conditions: a state of fear developed, to
some extent, by a general, nationwide popular literature and made
explicit by a few spectacular sex crimes; a series of scattered and conflicting reactions by many individuals and groups within the community; the appointment of a committee... which organizes existing
information regarding sex crimes ... and presents a sexual psychopath law to the legislature. 2 '
In our time, the same things happen, only worse, and faster. Although
Sutherland wrote of national news coverage, he was trying to explain why
individual states adopted sexual-psychopath laws. Horrifying incidents happened in individual states that, in climates already made sensitive to such
things by national news coverage, overreacted, created committees, etc.,
and passed laws that Sutherland deeply disapproved. They were based, he
said, on a series of propositions about identification and treatment of sexual
offenders that are "all false or questionable, [but] they have nevertheless
been very effective in the diffusion of the laws."'2 3
119.
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In our time, any incident anywhere can, given a drumbeat of national
publicity, influence policies in every state. Polly Klaas was killed in California, but the concerns her story raised influenced passage of harsh new
laws in many states."4 Megan Kanka was killed in New Jersey, but within a
few years, prodded by congressional threats of loss of federal funding, all
fifty states passed "Megan's laws."'25 This is partly because national media,
especially television, permeate nearly every pore of American life in vivid,
repetitive, often hysterical colors, and also because conservative American
politicians have for nearly two decades been playing the crime card and
exacerbating public fears and then proposing or enacting repressive legislation in order to allay them."6 Law reform need no longer await the outcome of deliberations of Sutherland's expert commissions.
III.

UNDERSTANDING CONTEMPORARY POLICY AND THOUGHT

It has taken a long time to get here, but now all the pieces are in place
to explain why previously unthinkable policy options like real offense sentencing, treatment of youth as an aggravating circumstance in sentencing,
and Kahan's disintegrative shaming are so thinkable in our time. Four factors
have coincided.
First, the United States has been undergoing wrenching social changes
for the past twenty-five years, like the Puritans of Massachusetts Bay Colony in the second half of the seventeenth century and the settled Protestant American middle classes in the nineteenth century.
Discussing the major changes at length would turn this into a historical
work and require competences I lack, but it takes little imagination to recognize that the overthrow of Jim Crow laws and the (as yet partial) realization of the civil rights movement; the Vietnam War and the long-lasting
turmoil associated with it; the feminist movement, the mass entry of women
into the paid labor market, and the (as yet partial) transformation in sexual
roles and stereotypes; the mass immigration of the past quarter century and
the increased diversity of the U.S. population; and the fundamental economic restructuring of the 1970s and 1980s have raised enormous anxieties
and caused fundamental changes in the lives of most Americans.
Second, levels of drug use and crime rates have been declining since
1980, and at such times, Musto's work demonstrates, people's attitudes
become more moralistic and monolithic, policy debates become less spirited,
124.

See Lieb et al., supra note 120, at 72-75.

125.

See id.
See generally THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE

126.

IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS (1991).

Rethinking Unthinkable PunishmentPolicies in America

1787

laws become harsher, and law enforcement becomes more relentless. In the
final chapter of the 1973 edition of The American Disease, written at a time
when drug use was increasing, Musto wrote optimistically about the impending era of moderate, good-faith approaches to drug policy: "The effective
translation of knowledge, scientific and historical, should enable the public
to avoid over-simplification, and to exert influence based on more rational
understanding."'21 In the final chapter of the revised 1987 edition of his
book, written at a time when drug use in America had been declining
among all age and ethnic groups for seven or eight years, he expressed his
apprehension that the fear of drugs would turn into a fear of the drug user
and be accompanied by draconian sentences and specious links between
drugs and marginalized groups, as had happened at earlier times in American history. 28 Both things Musto feared have happened-in the form of the
"War on Drugs," the 100-to-1 powder/crack cocaine sentencing distinction
in federal law, the crumbling of constitutional criminal procedural requirements under the imperatives of aggressive drug-law enforcement, and the
startling increase since 1980 in the numbers and percentages of black men
and women in American prisons convicted of drug offenses. 9
Third, during the period 1985-95, there was an almost unending series
of moral panics about crime problems: the panic precipitated by the 1986
cocaine-overdose death of basketball star Len Bias and the outbreak of the
"crack cocaine epidemic," which together led to passage of the federal AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1986,'" the 100-to-1 policy, and mandatory minimum
sentences of unprecedented length for drug crimes; the panics precipitated
by the deaths of Megan Kanka and Polly Klaas, leading to federal legislation
and major changes in sex-offender legislation throughout the country; and
the generalized fear of stranger violence represented by candidate George
Bush's use of Willie Horton as a campaign symbol, leading to unremitting
concern for toughness embodied in movements to abolish parole, greatly
increase sentence lengths, establish truth in sentencing, and require life
sentences without possibility of parole for third-strike offenders.
Fourth, building on all those things, conservative politicians for two
decades have harped on crime- and drug-policy issues, creating a political
climate in which few politicians have dared risk being seen as soft on drugs
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or crime. Political attention to crime issues seems to have abated somewhat
in the last few years, but mostly because liberal and Democratic politicians
have been coopted. President Clinton is often cynically congratulated for
having gotten to the right of Republicans on crime issues; this may have
been to Clinton's and other Democratic politicians' electoral advantage,
but only at the price of accepting enactment and continuation of criminal
justice policies of a ferocity not previously known in this country and
unknown today anywhere else in the Western world.
Sometimes when I write a paragraph like the preceding one, I refer to
cynical conservative politicians exacerbating public fears and then promising to assuage them through passage of harsh laws, but this time I did not
because the process is more complex than that. Demagogic appeals work best
when the public is prepared to respond to them. Crime was not a polarizing
issue in the 1950s not because politicians were more principled, statesmanlike, or intellectually honest than politicians today, but because it seldom
occurred to them to campaign on such issues except by rote. When they did,
voters were not much interested but instead responded more enthusiastically
to other issues. In the 1970s and 1980s, however, particularly in the South
and among working-class voters, crime issues acted both as a code word for
racial animosity and as an emotional appeal to voters who were anxious
about many changes in their lives. In the 198 0 s, if Musto's paradigm is apt,
declining drug-use and crime rates made voters less patient with moderate
and humane crime policies, less worried about unintended consequences of
harsh policies, and predisposed to respond to moralistic posturing and simplistic proposals. And moral panics, nationally amplified by ubiquitous national
mass media, have left many voters predisposed to respond emotionally to dramatic and drastic proposed solutions to what sometimes seem insuperable
problems.
These four factors are part of the world in which Americans live, part
of the backdrop against which our values and beliefs are formed and altered.
Many Americans are more intolerant of drug use and users than at other
times in our history, less worried about unfair treatment of "deviants," and
less patient with people and arguments that seem impractically or naively
idealistic. Some of those Americans, especially elected officials and others
in public life, are more ambivalent about contemporary policies and intolerance than they admit but are reluctant to speak out for fear of themselves
being vicariously stigmatized. The New York Times, for example, in an editorial commenting on passage of a congressional resolution rejecting a federal
sentencing commission proposal to eliminate the 100-to-i policy, reported
that probably no one in the Congress supported the policy on the merits,
and that Attorney General Janet Reno and President Clinton supported the

Rethinking Unthinkable Punishment Policies in America

1789

resolution because they "simply were afraid to appear remotely soft on
drugs.'3
In our time, the broad waves of sensibility that Musto suggests are associated with the moralism of a period of declining drug use, and that are
likely also associated with times of declining crime rates, have provided an
especially receptive climate for the calls of moral entrepreneurs who are
themselves responding to the hysteria and tendency to overreaction associated with moral panics, all in a destabilized era of massive social and economic change. All the conditions of the past quarter century have conduced
to the crime and drug policies with which we now live, and only politicians
of a much higher caliber than we are ever likely to enjoy could have been
expected not to seek personal advantage from that constellation of conditions.
CONCLUSION: BETTER UNDERSTANDING, BETTER PEOPLE, AND
BETTER POLICIES
For a civil society, the United States has adopted criminal justice policies that reflective people should abhor and that informed observers from
other Western countries do abhor.' The profound objections should be to
the processes by which criminal justice policies are set, even more than to the
policies themselves. That strong social-structural and psychological forces of
a moment or a year can cause many people to act intemperately and cruelly
may, in some ways, be understandable. Human beings are not entirely rational
animals, and, while it is regrettable and often in retrospect regretted, bad
decisions and bad policies sometimes result from extreme circumstances.
But U.S. crime policy for nearly two decades has been driven much more by
ideology, exaggerated fears, and political opportunism than by rational
analysis of options and reasoned discussion, almost as if a continuous moral
panic has prevented policy makers from stepping back and reflecting on
what they have been doing. A combination of factors has, in effect, created
conditions resembling a continuous moral panic. If we can recognize that,
and take it into account, it ought to be possible to do better. I see two ways
to do that.
The first, less likely because more heroic, is to recognize that the institutional organization of the American criminal justice system conduces to punitive excesses and to move toward new institutional arrangements in which
short-term passions are less likely to affect policy and practice. Achievement
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of moderate, humane practices and policies may be easier in countries in
which judges and prosecutors are nonpolitical, career civil servants, as in most
Civil Law countries, or are appointed for life under circumstances in which
partisan considerations are generally regarded as fundamentally inappropriate, as in England, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, rather than
being elected or appointed according to political criteria as in the United
States. Career officials are more likely to consider policy proposals and decisions in individual cases from long-term perspectives of whether in principle
they will improve the quality of justice or the effectiveness of administration. Politically selected officials are more likely to be influenced by shortterm political or cultural forces. At the extreme, many American prosecuting
attorneys appear constantly to be campaigning and often to formulate their
law-reform proposals, their general policies, and their tactics in individual
cases on the basis of how they will be reported and how the reports will be
received by the general public on the evening news programs. Elected judges
also are not immune to influence by consideration of the effects of their
decisions on their reelection prospects. Put less tendentiously, short-term
politically selected officials are less likely to be influenced by long-term considerations, institutional history, or abstract principles of justice. For career
officials, by contrast, commitment to a set of abstract principles of justice is
likely to be part of a sense of professionalism and professional self-esteem.
In addition, American prosecutors and judges are likely to have much shorter
careers than their counterparts in other Western countries, which means
that they often lack awareness of the past experiences of their offices or of
their profession and lack a personal or professional interest in long-term
effects of changed policies on the justice system. Many assistant state and
federal prosecutors, for example, plan to work as prosecutors only for a few
years while they get litigation experience, after which most will enter private
law practice. Many elected state prosecutors and appointed U.S. Attorneys
serve only for a few years and aspire to be appointed to a judgeship, to be
elected to a higher political office, or to enter a lucrative career in private law
practice. Many judges are elected or appointed in midcareer or later and are
from backgrounds that give them little knowledge of criminal justice policy.
Changing institutional arrangements so that judges and prosecutors are less
likely to act out of anger, cupidity, ignorance, or political self-interest will
not prevent adoption of bad policies, but it will help, because these actors
make up important constituencies that can influence policy makers.
The second, less heroic, but perhaps no more likely, implication of this
Article is that elected officials and other policy makers should become
much more reflective than most now are about the complex and competing
interests and values that criminal justice policies encompass. In the Intro-
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duction, I quoted various bits of folk wisdom by which thoughtful people
govern their daily lives-things like "Don't take it out on your child" or "Sit
down and count to ten." Aphorisms like these are commonly part of our
personal ethics because we know that things that make us angry or depressed
often make us irritable and in danger of overreacting or taking out our upset
on whoever is close at hand, and that's not fair. The child or spouse or
employee who is abused because of other things happening in the abuser's
life has been treated unfairly. This happens more often than most people
like to admit but gives rise to guilty feelings later, to resolutions not to let it
happen again, and to aphorisms like those quoted.
What is right in private lives would be right in public life. Moral
panics, cyclical patterns of moral intolerance, and anxieties associated with
fundamental social changes all increase pressures for adoption of harsh,
inhumane, and ill-considered crime policies, and, knowing that, policy
makers should try all the harder to separate the ephemeral and emotional
from the lasting and reflective. My guess is that most elected officials, in
their private lives, try to manage their outbursts of emotion and their
displacements of anger. If they did so in their public lives, contemporary
American crime policies would look very different, and real offense sentencing, youth as an aggravating circumstance, and disintegrative shaming
would be as unthinkable in this country as they are everywhere else.

